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    INTRODUCTION 
 
 Peter Wason (1966, 1968) designed one of the experimental tasks most used by 
the cognitive psychologists to study how subjects reason: the selection task. The main 
objective of this work is to present some of the experimental studies on this task that 
there have analyzed the role of semantic and pragmatic variables, such as the content 
of the rule, the context, the empirical knowledge or the experience of the subjects. In 
addition, the principal theoretical explanations on the task will be described: The 
Theory of Pragmatic Reasoning Schemas, the Social Contract Theory, the Heuristic-
Analytic and the Double Process Theories and the Mental Models Theory (Johnson-
Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991; 2002). We focus on the last one, that is the 
main framework in which professor García Madruga developed his research on 
reasoning during decades. He is a key reference for the authors from the eighties and it 
is a pleasure for us to have this opportunity of honouring him.  
 
 
THE SELECTION TASK:  
SOME EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
  
 This task involves presenting the subjects with four cards which have a number 
(odd or even) written on one side and a letter (vowel or consonant) on the other side. 
Immediately afterwards, a conditional rule is presented: “If a card has a vowel on one 
side then it has an even number on the other side”. Subjects were shown four cards 
which had on their exposed sides: a vowel, a consonant, an even number and an odd 
number. They had to select wich cards to turn over in order to decide whether the 
rule is true or false. Less than 10% of subjects answered correctly: “E” and “7”. 
Furthermore, they systematically committed different mistakes: they either selected the 
card “E” (verification bias: Wason, 1968) or they selected “E” and “4” cards (matching 
bias: Evans, 1972, 1998). Why intelligent adults fail to solve it?. In order to answer 
this question, other versions were designed. A selection of empirical research on the 
thematic task is presented in table 1. 
_______________ 
* This work was presented at the Psychology and Thinking Comprehension. International Meeting in 
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* Part of this work was published at Gomez-Veiga, I. Duque de Blas, G., Moreno Ríos, S. Santamaría 
Moreno, C. & Luque Vilaseca, J.L. (Eds.) (2017), Psychology and Thinking Comprehension. International 
Meeting in honour of Juan A. García-Madruga.  ISBN: AE-2017-17012654. 
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Table 1. Some empirical research on semantic and pragmatic factors  
in the selection task, in chronological order. 
 
Authors Rule-Example Result-Explanation 
Wason & 
Shapiro (1971) 
“Every time I go to Manchester I 
travel by car” 




“If a letter is sealed , then it has a 
50 lira stamp on it” Facilitation of thematic content. 
Manktelow & 
Evans (1979) 
“If I eat a haddck, then I drink 
gin” 
No thematic facilitation in arbitrary 
relationship. 
Griggs & Cox 
(1982) 
“If a person is drinking beer, then 
the person must over 19 years of 
age” 




“If you tidy up your room, then 
you may go out to play” 
Selection of cards wich breaks the rule: 





“If a person is driving a car, then 
he must be over 18 years old” 





“If a person is sitting in the front 
seat of a car, then that person 
must be over 12 years of age” 
Better performance in thematic version. 





“If a person is riding a motorbyke 
then he must wear a helmet” 
Interactive effect instructions and 




“If Baltimore is on one side of the 
ticket then plane is on the other 
side of the ticket” 
 
Better performance in deontic version.  
Individual differences. 
Martín, Valiña 
& Evans (1999) 
“If a card has a bricklayer 
written on one side,  then it must 
have/has hard hat written on the 
other side” 
 
Effect of scenario in deontic problems. 





“If a person is more than 18 
years old, then he has the right to 
vote” 
Facilitation of violation instructions. 
Better performance in the thematic-




“If an employee gets a day off 
during the week, then that 
employee must have worked on 
the weekend” 
 
Looks for a rule-history coherence. 
Girotto, 
Kemmelmeier, 
Sperber & van  
der Henst (2001) 
“If a person travels to any East 
African country, then that person 
must be immunized against 
cholera” 
 
The context expressed in the text 
modulates the relevance to make 
inferences. 
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 Table 1 (continued). Some empirical research on semantic and pragmatic  




& Harper (2002) 
“If a customer lives in Tavistock 
then they pay the reduce tariff”. 
“If a customer lives … 
Plymouth/Totnes then they pay 
the reduced tariff” 
 
Selection of cards influenced by the 
presence of a second rule. 
Ayal & Klar 
(2014) 
“If you buy my miracle medicine 
for $ 12.50, you will be cured in 
less than ten days”. “If you give 
me $ 60, then I will have the 
furniture delivered and assembled 
in your home”  
 
Different cheating ploys modulate the 
selection. 




Attance & Caza 
(2015) 
"If it is the first day of the month, 
then there must be pancakes for 
lunch” 
“If the child takes a cookie then 
the child must have earned a gold 
star sticker” 
 
Interaction type of problem (“cheater or 
non-cheater”) and parental connection 




“If you go out at night, then you 
must first milk the cow”. 
“If a man eats cassava root, then 
he must have a tattoo on his face”
Structural priming.  
Reasoning is based on specific evolved 
reasoning abilities. 
 
 The role of thematic factors is one of the key questions analyzed in the empirical 
research. To theoretical level, how the influence of these variables in reasoning with the 
selection task has been explained? 
 
THE SELECTION TASK: THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS 
  The Theory of Pragmatic Schemas (Cheng and Holyoak, 1985; 1989) and the 
Theory of Social Contract (Cosmides, 1985; 1989) have explained the content effect in 
the selection task. The first one suggested that some versions of the task can trigger 
special rules learned from the life experiences: pragmatic schemas, which express 
permissions or obligations. For example: "If a precondition is not satisfied then the 
action must not be taken". From the Theory of Social Contract, the subjects activates 
social contract rules, such as "If you take a benefit, then you pay a cost" and a procedure 
for checking cheaters, that is evolved as a result of natural selection. 
 
 The Heuristic-Analytic Theory (Evans, 1984; 1989) proposes two general phases 
in the reasoning: the phase of heuristic processing, based on selecting the relevant 
information and the analytical phase of explicit reasoning. The execution can be 
modulated in both phases (Evans, 2006), for linguistic, semantic and / or pragmatic 
variables. These factors will determine what cards are the relevant ones to be selected 
like correct. Linked with this approach, the Theory of Double Process (Evans and Over, 
1996; Evans and Stanovich, 2013), proposes the existence of two systems: the system 1 
or implicit, that facilitates the automatic activation of the empirical knowledge to reason 
and the system 2 or explicit, that is the base of the hypothetical thinking (Evans, 2019). 
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 The Theory that has proposed the elaboration of semantic representations to 
reason is the Theory of Mental Models (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird and Byrne, 
1991; 2002). The subjects reason elaborating mental models from the meaning of the 
premises and the general knowledge. They represent only true models (principle of 
true). The conclusion provided is valid if there is no a counterexample (that is a 
possibility in which the premises hold but the conclusion does not hold). Due to the 
working memory limitation, subjects consider only those cards explicitly represented in 
their initial models of the rule. If it is not possible to elaborate the conclusion from this 
representation, then they flesh out other alternative models. Specifically, in the rule 
presented in Wason´s original version: “If a card have a vowel on one side, then it have 
an even number on the other side” subjects tend to construct the following mental 
models and to base their selections on them: 
    
   vowel   even   
      . . . 
 
 The model theory allows to explain both the correct answer and the most 
frequent mistakes. For example, reasoners can commit the matching bias because they 
attend to those elements that they have explicitly represented in the initial model. Any 
manipulation that makes explicit what is false, can lead subjects to flesh out the three 
explicit models of the conditional and should enhance performance in the selection task: 
 
         vowel    even  
    ¬ vowel    even 
    ¬ vowel ¬ even 
 
  
 The Theory of Mental Models has explained the role of thematic factors from 
the mechanisms of semantic-pragmatic modulation (Johnson-Laird and Byrne, 2002). 
The content of the rule, the context and the general knowledge can block or activate the 
construction of alternative models, controls the subjects´s selections and definitively, 





 Different variables have been proposed in order to explain the reasoning with the 
four card problem. An important part of empirical researches on the task seem to 
emphasize the plasticity of the reasoning towards factors related to the content, the 
context and the empirical knowledge (Valiña & Martín, 2016). To theoretical level, 
some of the main approaches that have explained the reasoning with this task are: the 
Theory of Pragmatic Schemas, the Social Contract Theory, the Theory of Heuristic-
Analytic and the Double Process Theory and the Theory of Mental Models. The 
experimental research with this metainference task constitutes the base of general 
theoretical debates as the analysis of the most suitable methods to study the reasoning, 
the human rationality or the study of the individual differences (Chater et al., 2018; 
Seoane, Valiña, Rodríguez, Martín & Ferraces, 2007; Stanovich & West, 1998; 
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